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II.—PROF. ALEXANDER'S GIFFORD
LECTURES l (I.).
BY C. D. BBOAD.
PROBABLY few of the courses delivered under the Gifford
bequest have been so eagerly awaited by philosophers as
Prof. Alexander's. We all knew that he had an extremely
ingenious and original system ' up his sleeve ' ; his scattered
articles and his synopsis had served to whet rather than to
slake our curiosity; and reports from those who listened to
the lectures at Glasgow encouraged the hope that England
was at length to produce a comprehensive system of con-
structive metaphysics in which the speculative boldness of
the great Germans should be combined with the critical good
sense of Locke, Hume, and Berkeley. On the whole, Prof.
Alexander's readers will not be disappointed; they will feel,
whether they agree with his conclusions or not, that he has
at least produced a work in the grand manner.
The book is of stupendous size, occupying nearly eight
hundred pages. It is therefore quite impossible to treat it
with anything like adequacy. What I propose to do is to
start by giving a neutral account of Prof. Alexander's general
conclusions, and then to discuss in somewhat greater detail
the arguments by which he supports certain of these.
SYNOPSIS.
Everything in the universe, according to our author, is a
differentiation of one fundamental stuff, called Space-Time.
Space without time and time without space are abstractions,
legitimate enough when properly denned and used, but con-
tradictory if taken in isolation. S.-T. is really Motion, but
we have to remember that it is not the motion of things in
space during time. Let us call it Pure Motion, and defer for
1
 Space, Time, and Deity, S. Alexander, vol. i., pp. xii., 347 ; rol. ii.,
_pp. xiii., 437. London : Macmillan «t &>., 1920.
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'26 C. D. BKOAD:
the present the question whether such a thing be really con-
ceivable. All things are complexes of motions of various
kinds, which persist within more or less constant contours.
(I think the vortex-atom theory provides a helpful analogy to
this view of Prof. Alexander's, though it would certainly mis-
represent him if pressed too far.) There are certain features
which characterise, in some form or other, all possible bits
of 8.-T.; these are called Categories. They are in no sense
mind-dependent. Different bits of S.-T. will exhibit these
general characteristics in different special forms; thus every-
thing will have some shape and size, but one thing will be
circular and another square. The particular forms in which
a thing exemplifies the categories are the primary qualities of
the thing. On the other hand there are qualities which only
belong to complexes of a certain degree of complexity; they-
appear in different lorins among different complexes of the
right degree of complexity, but they do not belong in any
form whatever to those of lower degree. These are called
secondary qualities. They are in no sense mind-dependent,,
nor are they in general dependent on the physiological
peculiarities of a percipient's body. Thus any set of motions
of the right degree of complexity, when illuminated by the
right sort of light (itself a form of motion), is red; and its
redness is independent alike of the presence of a percipient
mind and of the presence of a normally constructed eye. If
either of these be lacking the red colour will not be seen, but
that is the whole difference that will be made. Secondary
qualities form an hierarchy in the sense that those which
come higher in the scale belong to motion-complexes which
also possess all the lower qualities. Thus the highest second-
ary quality that we know is mentality; this only belongs to
motion-complexes such as brains; but brains also have the
secondary qualities of life, chemical affinity, colour, and
inertia—to mention them in descending order. Prof. Alex-
ander further holds that a motion-complex with a higher
secondary quality is always a distinct part of a larger com-
plex, specially connected with this part, but possessing only
lower secondary qualities. Thus our brains, which have
mentality as well as life, etc., are specially differentiated parts
of our bodies. The remaining parts have life, etc., but not
mentality. Similarly he holds that in a blue body the peculiar
motions that are blue are merely dotted about the contour,
the interstices being filled with simpler motion-complexes
which have only mechanical properties. At each new stage
in the hierarchy something genuinely new appears in the
universe. There is no possibility of predicting that such and.
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PROP. ALEXANDER'S GIFFOKD LECTURES. '27
such a type of motion-complex will have such and such a
quality until you have actually found that this kind of com-
plex does in fact have this kind of quality. Such novelty is
clearly compatible with complete obedience to law; it is
a law of nature that such and such a complex has such
and such a quality, but it is an irreducible law and cannot
be discovered until instances of its operation have been
met.
On Prof. Alexander's view, then, there is nothing sacrosanct
about mind. It is just one stage in the hierarchy of qualities,
as closely bound to brain as colour is to certain types of vi-
bration. It happens to be the highest quality that we know ;
but, in the first place, even if there be higher qualities we could
not know them, and, in the second, even if there be not now
higher qualities there certainly will be such in course of time.
Nothing in the world depends on mind, either for its existence
or for even the most trivial of its qualities, with the single
exception of value. Prof. Alexander takes an obvious pleasure
in 'dressing down' and 'telling off' the exaggerated claims
of mind, and I suspect that he secretly cherishes a hope that
in the New Jerusalem, whose charter is the Treaty of
Versailles and whose streets are paved with paper-currency,
this journal may be rechristened SPACE-TIME. The main
importance of mind for philosophy is that in it we can read
in large and familiar letters types of relation which are
common to all orders of existence, but are obscure to us from
the very simplicity that they assume in lower orders of reality.
There is nothing peculiar about the cognitive relation ; there
is one common relation in which any part of S.-T. stands to
any other that affects it. Exactly the same relation of
' compresence' unites me to a book that I read, and a plant
to the soil that it grows in. But the quality of the reaction
differs, because my brain is so complex as to possess mentality
while the plant is only complex enough to possess life. It is
for this reason that my relation to the book is called cogni-
tive, whilst the plant's relation to the soil is not. A com-
plex of a given order can stand in this relation to any
complex of a lower order, but not to itself or to any other of
the Fame order or d fortiori to one of a higher order. A mind
' enjoys,' but does not ' contemplate' itself and its states ; a
plant 'enjoys' its own life, it cannot' contemplate' it, though
in a wide sense it can contemplate the soil that it lives in
and the purely mechanical processes tnat go on in its own
structure.
Now, knowing that I come at a certain stage in a hierarchy
of complexes, I can understand that complexes may arise in
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28 c. D. BBOAD:
the future, or may even exist now, which stand in the same
relation to me as that in which my brain stands to the rest
of my body. Brain is a highly differentiated part of living
matter with the new quality of mentality; so there might be
complexes whose constituents are brains, and these might
possess a new quality. A being so constituted would con-
template minds as minds contemplate life, and would enjoy
its own peculiar quality as minds enjoy themselves. Such a
being would be for us a god or angel, and its peculiar^new
quality would be deity or godhood. In this sense we are
gods to plants; for they only live, whilst we think as well as
live. But our gods would not be gods to themselves ; their
gods would be hypothetical beings of the next stage in the
hierarchy. The world, considered as the matrix which is going
to produce beings with godhood, is what we mean by God.
If this stage be ever reached there will not be God but gods,
and their God will be the world regarded as the matnx of
the next stage. Thus we may sum up Prof. Alexander's the-
ology in two parodies: ' God never is, but always to exist,'
and ' There is no God but gods '.
The one place in Prof. Alexander's system where minds
come into their own is in connexion with values. These he
calls Tertiary Qualities. Truth, goodness, and beauty would
not exist if there were no minds. This does not mean that
they are subjective in the sense that there is no question of
right or wrong judgment about them. It means that the
only entities that have these qualities contain minds as con-
stituents. Truth, e.g., belongs neither to minds as such nor
to objects as such, but to the complex mind-con templating-
object. And it is perfectly possible to believe that such a
complex has the tertiary quality of truth when, in fact, it has
that of falsehood. Moreover, these values are essentially
social; they arise out of the intercourse of minds, some of
whom are right and others wrong in their judgments or
actions. There are analogies to the tertiary qualities at levels
below mind. Thus adaptation, or the lack of it, of a plant to
its environment is a value, and it is an attribute of the whole
situation plant—living in—environment.
There is one other feature in the system that must be
mentioned. Prof. Alexander, in common, I suppose, with
most philosophers, is concerned to maintain that the actual
is logically prior to the possible. Univereals for him are
types of pattern in S.-T., and are meaningless in any other
connexion. And it is owing solely to the actual constitution
of S.-T., which is homoloidal, that universals are possible at
all. He has therefore to devote a good deal of argument to
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PROF. ALEXANDER'S GIFFORD LECTURES. 29
apparent exceptions, such as four-dimensional and non-
homoloidal spaces, which seem, on the face of them, to be
other possible instances of universals which, instead of falling
within S.-T., are genera of which actual 8.-T. is merely one
possible specification.
I have now, I hope, given a fair and intelligible account of
the main outlines or Prof. Alexander's theory. The book con-
tains, in addition to what I have mentioned, many very valuable
discussions about particular categories such as Bubstance,
cause, intensity, etc. But space forbids entering into details.
I propose therefore to devote the rest of this article to a fuller
account and some criticisms of the doctrines of Space-Time,
Mind, the hierarchy of Qualities, the nature of Universals,
and Deity.
A. SPACE-TIME.
It is idle to pretend that S.-T., as introduced to us in this
book, is easy to understand. We must of course distinguish
between the doctrine itself and the arguments for it; the latter
might be false or inconclusive, whilst the former, if we could
understand it, might still be a valuable alternative in terms
of which to construe the world. Let us first try then to get
some idea of S.-T. For Prof. Alexander the proximately
fundamental thing is the event-particle. An event-particle,
is the limiting case of a motion ; moreover there is a motion-
quality—presumably what one is aware of when looking at
an object that moves quickly enough—but it is not, like
genuine qualities, correlated with certain motions, it just is
the motion. (Cf. Vol. I., p. 321.) Now motion does not imply
something that moves ; it is anterior to things and is the stuff
of which they are made (I., 329). So it would seem that
ultimately the fundamental thing is pure motions. These will
differ from each other, of course, in direction, in the place and
time where they happen, and s(o on. But we leave these
matters aside for the moment'. The intrinsic difference
between them will be their swiftness; and if you ask how
you are to understand a motion which is not the motion of
something, I suppose the answer would be that e.g., you can
see a difference between a swifter or slower motion, and that
this is independent of what happens to be moving. We are
told that the best way to think of an event-particle is to
start by thinking of a very simple qualitied event—e.g., a flash
of red colour. Then think away the quality of redness; the
residuum is an event-particle. (Cf. I., 4H, note.) Similarly
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3 0 C. D. BROAD :
I suppose that the best way to think ?f a pure motion is to
compare the jump given by the second handjsf your watch
with that given by the minute hand of a big pUbHc^cjock;
then think away the other qualities of the moving object and
just bear in mind the observable difference in the perceived
jumps. The important point to notice is that for Prof.
Alexander the pure motion is not an abstractum incapable of
actual existence ; it is a real particular, which in the special
case of the watch-hand happens to have other perceptible
qualities. Such pure motions are to be taken as fundamental
and unanalysable; space and time are abstract a derived
from them by a legitimate process. The event-particle is
a kind of half-way house between motions and space or
time. It is a limit which has spatial and temporal character-
istics, and I imagine, also something corresponding to the
swiftness of the motion whose limit it is. I think Prof.
Alexander might have made all this very much clearer if he
had known of Whitehead's work on Extensive Abstraction."
It does not seem to me that his exposition of the nature of
S.-T. is particularly clear. I have had to gather my notions
of it from hints scattered all over the first volume, and my
interpretation may quite well be wrong.
Now of course it seems extremely odd to the reader at first
sight to take pure motions as fundamental and to analyse
space and time out of them. For our normal procedure is to
regard motion as analysable into the successive occupation of
points of space by a bit of matter or by a recognisable quality
or state of affairs. Still we know from experience in other
branches of knowledge that it is often equally legitimate to
regard A and B as fundamental and to construct G out of
them or to regard C as fundamental and construct A and B
out of them. Geometry offers many examples of this fact
Hence we ought to regard the possibility of Prof. Alexander's
procedure with an open mind. But he holds that we ought
to go much further than this; for he thinks he can prove
that there are contradictions in space and time taken by
themselves, and that these only vanish when they are taken
in connexion with each other as characteristics of pure
motions. Thus two questions arise: (i) Does Prof. Alexander
succeed in constructing space and time from his S.-T. of pure
motions ? and (ii) Is it necessary to proceed in this way; is
there really any objection to the more usual course which
makes motion derivative ?
The derivation of space and time occurs in the chapter on
Perspectives and Sections cf S.-T. Once more I must put the
matter in my own words, and it may be that I have mis-
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PBOF. ALEXANDER'S GIFFOBD LECTOBES. 31
understood the theory. Take any event-particle e,,. If I am
right, this will have a spatial characteristic a, a temporal
characteristic t, and a ' quality ' corresponding to the swift-
ness of the motion of which it is a limit. We must not sup-
pose that the a and t factors are really separable; they are
essentially bound up with each other and I suppose that the
intensive quality of swiftness is the way in which the two
are combined. Now (a) we can consider all the event-particles
contemporary with e*. These constitute a section. We
might be inclined to say that the s-factors of ail such particles
is what is meant by space at the moment t. This would be
a mistake according to Prof. Alexander. The reason ap-
parently is that even by space at a moment we do not mean
instantaneous space. Nothing instantaneous would have the
properties of a space, for reasons which we shall have to con-
sider later. 1 would remark at this point, however, that it is
not obvious why a section should not be at least as legitimate
a notion as an event-particle. Doubtless a space of con-
temporary points is a conceptual limit, but then so is an
event-particle. However, there is another way of classifying
points with respect to a given event-particle, and this provides
another and—according to Prof. Alexander—more legitimate
meaning of space at an instant. We can consider (b) the class
of all event-particles, which are either (i) intrinsically con-
temporary with e,t, or (ii) are earlier stages of motions of
which the assigned particle is a stage, or (lii) are later stages
of such motions. This class is called a perspective with
respect to «rt. It obviously includes event-particles of various
dates. The s-factors of all these constitute space at t from
the point s. Such a perspective of course includes many sets
of contemporary event-particles, but many event-particles
contemporary with any such set will fall outside the per-
spective to which the set belongs. E.g., two flashes of light
and a sound might start at the same moment from points
equidistant from «« and the flashes might pass through s at t.
The three initial events would then be intrinsically contem-
porary ; but the starting of the two flashes would be in the
perspective while that of the sound would not, because it
coula not—owing to its smaller velocity—be on a course of
motion that contains eu-
A difficulty that I feel about this notion of perspectives is
the following: We are here supposed to be at the level of
pare unqualitied space-time. But all examples of perspectives
have been in terms of definite qualified events with character-
istic rates of transmission, sucn as light or sound. Now the
question is: Could one attach any meaning to perspectives
3 *
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32 c. D. BROAD:
without these characteristically different velocities of trans-
mission, and are not these velocities merely empirical, i.e.,
characteristic of special complexes of 8.-T. and not of 8.-T:
as such ? I question the legitimacy of the notion of per-
spectives at the level of pure S.-T. If Prof. Alexander answers
that there are differences of intensive magnitude even among
pure motions, there is another question that I must raise.
An event-particle is a limit, a kind of mathematical device,
bene fundatum indeed, but not a genuine part of S.-T. Is it
supposed to represent in some way, not only the spatial and
temporal characteristics of a certain stage in a pure motion,
but also the intensity of the motion (».«., its velocity) ? On the
one hand this seems necessary if there be intrinsic differences
of intensity even among pure motions, and if event-particles
are to be an adequate device for dealing with such motions.
But, on the other, in the doctrine of perspectives a single
event-particle is assumed to belong to various motions of
various degrees of swiftness, e.g., to the course of a wave of
sound and to that of a wave of light which arrive at the
same time. I confess that I find this very puzzling. If
pure motions do not differ intrinsically perspectives seem out
of place at the level of pure S.-T. But if they do then I do
not see how you can talk of a single event-particle com-
mon to a number of intrinsically different motions; it would
rather seem as if we should need a plurality of event-
particles with the same spatial and temporal factors but some
difference in quality to represent the different intrinsic swift-
nesses of the different pure motions of which they are the
limits.
To proceed. Two different kinds of sections and perspec-
tives are possible with respect to a given event-particle e,t.
We might consider the class of event-particles co-punctual
with e,t, and say that the Mactors of all these constitute
time at the point s. Again Prof. Alexander will not allow
this, because m his view it is essential that time—even if it be
in a certain sense time at a point—shall not have all its
instants confined to one point. Accordingly, instead of such
a section, we take a new kind of perspective. We include in
it (i) all event-particles co-punctual with «„, and (ii) other-
wise include the same event-particles as in our previous per-
spective. We now consider the temporal factors of all these
particles. Thus the ' temporal perspective ' from ert includes
event-particles of the form e(c but none of the form ejt, whilst
the ' spatial perspective' includes particles of the form e?,
but none of the form e&; for the former refers to a centre
with fixed spatial characteristics and the latter to a centre
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PBOP. ALBXANDEB'S GIPPOBD LECTDBES. 33
with fixed temporal characteristics. This, at least, is how I
interpret the rather difficult statements in I., 75-76.
8.-T. as a whole is just all the pure event-particles. Any
perspective is a selection of event-particles. In any per-
spective every position in space and every instant of time is
represented by some event-particle, but there are many event-
particles absent from any given perspective. Perspectives
are inter-connected and include between them all event-
particles. 'Points of space which are simultaneous in one
perspective may be successive in another . . .' (L, 77).
I take this startling statement to be a Pickwickian way of
asserting that the perspective Pj may contain the event-
particles ea and e^, whilst the perspective P, may contain
en and «„-.
I find some difficulty in following Prof. Alexander's account
of total space and total time, and their connexion with
sections. His view seems to be the following: Total space is
the space-factors of all event-particles, and total time is their
time-factors. But if s be any point there are event-particles
of the form e,t, where t ranges over all possible values. Simil-
arly if t be any moment there are event-particles of the form
e*z where s ranges over all possible values. Thus, whilst a
section is not what we mean by space, because space confined
to a moment is impossible; yet, since every position is in
fact correlated with any moment, such a section does contain
every position in total space. Similar remarks apply to tem-
poral sections and total time. Thus momentary spaces and
punctual times, though fictions, do possess respectively all
the geometrical properties of total space and all the chrono-
logical properties of total time.
I must confess, however, that I am highly doubtful of the
above interpretation, because there are statements that seem
to imply and others that seem to conflict with it. We are
told (I., 81) that ' in total S.-T. each point is in fact repeated
through the whole of time, and each instant over the whole
of space '. This certainly seema, to mean that for any s there
are ««'s in which t ranges through all possible values, and
mutatis mutandis for any t. But we also read on the same
paje that ' at any moment of its real history Space is not al)
of onn date, and Time is not all at one point'. And on (I.
82-83) we learn that ' . . . in their combination Space if
always variously occupied by Time, and Time spread vari-
ously over Space '. This certainly seems to mean that if t tx
any moment the s values of the e«'s do not range over al
possible values. I take it that the odd statement that at anj
moment of its history Space is not all of one date must Lx
3
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34 C D . BBOAD :
regarded us analytical. It simply, tells as what Prof. Alex-
ander intends the phrase Space at^such and such a date to
mean. It tells us that he means by it the spatial facton of
the event-particles in a perspective taken from an event-
particle with the assigned date. These factors of course
belong to particles of various dates. The only way^that I can
see to reconcile the apparent flat contradiction between the
quotations from L, 81, and I., 82-83 is to substitute in the
latter for the words Space and Time the phrases: The space
of a perspective and The time of a perspective. I may be
very stupid, but I feel that more light is badly wanted
here.
On I., 217 occurs the statement " . . . every point differs
from any other by its instant, and every instant by its point ".
Such assertions are common, yet (a) the phrases its point and
its instant seem to imply a one to one correlation between
points and instants. This is elsewhere vigorously denied.
Each point belongs to a plurality of instants and conversely.
We might then (b) be tempted to substitute its points and its
instants, and to suppose that what is meant is that if C, and tt
be two different moments, then some at least of the s's in the
class of event-particles of the form e^, are different from the
j's in the class of particles of the form eMl. But this seems
incompatible with the statement that each moment is at
every point and each point at every moment. Again (c) we
are repeatedly told that there are intrinsically contemporary
points, i.e., that there are event-particles with the same time-
factor and different space-factors. A pair of such points can-
not differ from each other by 'their instants,' for 'their
instants'—i.e., those of the event-particles of which they are
the space-factors—are identical.
It seems to me then that the doctrine of S.-T. and its con-
nexion with space and time is by no means clear, and that,
as expounded, it contains inconsistencies. These may be
merely verbal; they certainly need further elucidation from
Prof. Alexander; and, until this be given, I do not feel
certain that S.-T., as offered, is even a possible way of
analysing the world. But our author thinks it not merely
possible but necessary, because of the failure of all alternatives
that try to do without it Let us then consider his arguments
for this view.
The argument substantially is that time without space and
space without time involve contradictions which vanish only
when the two are regarded as intimately linked factors of
pure events. Before discussing this view in detail it is well
to note that the time and space which are convicted of these
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PBOF. ALBXANDBB'S GIFFOBD LECTUBES. 35
faults are assumed to be neither qualities of things or events
nor relations between them. Now, it is at least possible that
if the difficulties that arise be genuine, they are due not to
the separation of time and space, but to the initial assump-
tion that time and space are not merely relations between
events.
Time is a continuous duration of successive instants. If
time were alone this combination of attributes would be
impossible; it is only because time is essentially connected
with space that successive instants can form a continuous
duration. The argument is that a duration involves some
kind of togetherness. But the essence of successiveness is
that, when one moment exists, all earlier moments have
ceased and no later ones have begun to be. Hence time
would be a series of isolated nows. This argument seems to
me to be wholly invalid. All that has happened to the past
moments is that they have ceased to be present—a purely
psychological matter, as Prof. Alexander admits—not that
they have ceased to be. Togetherness, as Prof. Alexander
himself points out, means merely connexion and not simul-
taneity (L, 46). Nothing has been proved except the trivial
proposition that successive moments cannot be together in the
sense of being contemporary. It does not follow that they
cannot be together in the sense of forming a whole of related
terms, which whole is a duration. A tune is a whole of
related notes, and these notes are successive; why cannot a
duration be a whole of related but successive moments?
How is connexion with space supposed to heal the imper-
manence of time? This is explained in I., 44-49. Each
moment must be correlated with several points, and each
point with several moments. A point has permanence
because correlated with many instants. And successive
instants are ' together' as parts of a duration because they
are correlated with these persistent points. It would, perhaps,
be fair to put Prof. Alexander's argument as follows: There
can be no duration unless something endures. The moments
of time do not endure, therefore something is needed other
than time to give a duration. This something is the point
or points correlated with all the moments of a series- And
these points endure because each of them is correlated with a
number of moments. The argument rests on the fallacy that
a complex of related terms cannot have a property not
possessed by any of the terms. No instant endures; the
terms of duration are instants; but it does not follow that a
complex whose terms are instants related by the relation of
succession is not just what we mean by a stretch of duration :
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36 c. D. BBOAD:
e-g-, Trinity College has certain attributes which belong
neither to the Master nor to any of the Fellows; yet it just
is a complex composed of the Master and Fellows in certain
mutual relations-
Space, according to Prof. Alexander, is under reciprocal
obligations to time. Were it not for time space would be a
blank undifferentiated unity, and consequently not a con-
tinuum at all. This argument seems to rest on some form of
the Identity of Indiscemibles. It is assumed that if px and pt
be two different points there must be some qualitative differ-
ence between them. Pure space cannot supply these differ-
ences; we are not allowed to appeal to qualitied things or
events because of the preliminary rejection of the relative-
theory of space and time; hence time itself must be called in
to provide the qualitative distinction. How does time per-
form this service for space ? In J., 49-50 we learn that each
instant must be correlated with several points of space if time
is to differentiate space. This is apparently necessary in
order that time should be successive; otherwise it would
' be infected with bare blank extendedness'. But once the
successiveness of time is secured it is able to discriminate
points of space, presumably because different points are correl-
ated with different instants or sets of instants.
Now I confess that I find all this most difficult to follow
and still more so to believe. It does look as if space and time
were attempting, like the inhabitants of the Scilly Islands,
1
 to gain a precarious livelihood by taking in each other's
washing'. For let us put together the various statements
about the mutual services of time and space: (i) There are
stretches of time, in spite of the fleeting character of instants,
because each instant is connected with an enduring point;
(ii) points endure because each point is connected with a
plurality of different instants; (iii) instants differ because
each is connected with a (partially or totally?) different set
of points; (iv) points differ because each is connected with a
(partially or totally ?) different set of instants. To these pro-
positions we have to add the puzzling statement, already
quoted, that ' each point is in fact repeated throughout the
whole of time, and each instant over the whole of space'
(I., 81). How the first four statements can escape cir-
cularity and how the one jnst quoted can be reconciled with
(iii) and (iv), passes my wits to understand.
I suppose Prof. Alexander would take the line that this
circularity just shows the intimate connexion of time with
space. But tnis seems to me to be no answer. We were
given to understand that time without space and space without
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PROF. ALEXANDER'S GIFFOHD LECTURES. 37
time involved contradictions, but that these were healed when
the two were taken together, and that this contradiction in
the separate factors and its disappearance in their combination
was the great argument in favour of the doctrine of S.-T.
But it seems (a) that the contradictions do not exist and (b)
that, if they do, they only vanish to make way for vicious
circles.
Prof. Alexander is not content with the general connexion
between space and time which is supposed to be established
by the above arguments. He thinks he can prove the more
detailed proposition that the characteristics of temporal order
depend on the connexion of time with a space of three dimen-
sions. If space had but one dimension time would not be
irreversible; if space had but two dimensions there would be
no betweenness in time. I cannot follow these arguments,
in spite of the very kind and courteous help that Prof.
Alexander has given me by letter. I shall try to give an
account of his argument to prove the first point, and shall
state the difficulties that I feel, although he holds that I ought
not to- feel them.
The argument begins on I., 52; I shall put it in my
own words. If tl and tt be two instants and tA precedes tt
then tt cannot precede tv It is required to prove that if
space had only one dimension tt might precede ^ although t,
precedes tt. Take two event-particles «,,< and e, . . Prof.
Alexander says that ' the points «, and st suffice to distinguish
the instants . . . but not to determine whether ^ is prior k
t, as posterior'. (I have altered the notation, but made nc
other change.)
Before considering his proof there are two points to be
noticed: (a) The statement that the points «t and s, suffice to
distinguish t1 and t. seems inconsistent with other statements
that he makes. The same instant can be, and is, according
to him, connected with a plurality of points. Hence the
mere fact that the points 8, and «s differ does not suffice to
distinguish <, and tt. If he means that the difference of
points would suffice to distinguish the moments if space had
only one dimension, this is surely one of the things to be
proved. (6) There is a defect in the conclusion of the argu-
ment, which is, I think, merely verbal. Prof. Alexander
claims to prove that if space had only one dimension t{ might
be either before or after t^. This would be an irrelevant con-
clusion ; what he wants to prove is that t\ might be both
before and after tz if space had only one dimension. The
defect is only verbal, because if his argument proves anything
at all it does prove the latter proposition. Let us now
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consider the argument. It runs as follows: tu like all instants,
must be repeated in space. Hence there must be an event-
particle «,,(, as well as «,,(,. . Now, if space had only one dimen-
sion, and thus reduced to a line, sx might be on one side of s,
—the point connected with L—whilst «, was on the other
side of it. Indeed this must be so; for ' if «, and »t were on
the same side of «, their dates would be different,' whereas
they are assumed to be both tx. And if s} and st were on
different sides of «,, tx—which is connected with both «j and «,
—would be both before and after tt, which is connected with
st Put in terms of event-particles the argument is: There
must be at least two event-particles in different places both
with the date <,. If space be one-dimensional these places
must be on the same line as any other event-particle e,,t).
They cannot both be on the same side of this particle, for, if
so, their dates would differ. But if they were on opposite
sides of it their identical date tx would be both before and
after the date t3 of «,,«,.
It iB, of course, evident that this very obscure argument
rests on the fact that event-particles are limitB of pure motions.
If space were of one dimension all motions would be in one
line. If we conceive of «j and s, as being successive points in
the course of a single pure motion from s, to «,, it is, of course,
obvious that any point between «j and s, will be correlated
with a date between f, and £„ and that any point 5, on the
opposite side of s, to s, will be correlated with a date later
than «j. On this assumption it is no doubt true that tx
cannot be connected with two different points; if there is only
one motion there must be a one to one correlation between
space and time, whilst it is of the essence of the theory that
every point is connected with many instants and every
instant with many points. But I do not understand why
the one-dimensionality of space implies that the universe
consists of a single motion. In the first place are there or
are there not supposed to be intrinsic differences of velocity
among pure motions? If so, the present difficulty does not
arise. But if not, how can the doctrine of perspectives be—
as it is apparently meant to be—a doctrine about pure S.-T.'?
Again, even if all pure motions were in one Line and of one
velocity what prevents some from traversing the line in
one direction and others in the opposite direction ? And
what prevents a succession of pure motions with the same
velocity from traversing the b'ne in the same direction, and
thus passing through the same point at different dates?
Lastly, what prevents a plurality of pure motions of the same
velocity from starting in the same direction at the same
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moment from different points on the line and thus passing
throagh different points at the same date ? I conclude from
the note on L, 53 that there is probably some objection to all
these suggestions; bat I find the whole conception of pare
motions so radically obscnre that I do not know what pro-"
perties I may and what I may not ascribe to them.
(To he continued.)
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